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SrTUATIO:K III 
AIRCRAFT-HOSPITAL SHIPS 
States X and Y are at war. Other states. are neutral. 
(a) State X proclain1s and 1naintains "\vith vessels of 
war the surface blockade of the port of ~Iola on the coast 
of Y near the boundary of state B. Blockade proclaina-
tion states that the blockade includes aircraft. Aircraft 
and subn1arines of Y and of neutral flags pass the block-
ade line 'vith ease. 
( 1) A private seaplane of state B becon1es disabled 
and alights inside the blockade lines. A cruiser of X 
seizes the sea plane on the ground that it has violated 
the blockade. 
(2) \\T ould the treahnent of the seaplane be the san1e 
if it had alighted 50 n1iles outside the blockading lines 
and had been 1net by a yessel of 'var of X 'vhich had 
no connection ''ith the blockading forces. 
(b) A 1nilitary aircraft of state Y becon1es disabled 
off the coast of state B and lands at an airport of B. 
State B inunediately interns the aircraft and crew. 
(c) At a port of R, ren1ote fron1 X and Y, an arn1ecl 
private aircraft of X calls to obtain fuel to take the air-
craft directly to its port of departure in state X. 
(d) An aircraft of X dropped a tear gas bo1nb upon 
a vessel of war of Y. Y declares that this act is contrary 
to the laws of war and that it will in retaliation use 
bacteriological bo1nbs against X. 
(e) A n1ilitary hospital ship of X, the Safety flying 
the Reel Cross flag passing 'vithin sight of but not near 
a fleet of Y, reports what it has seen to the con11nander 
of the fleet of X. 
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(1) Neutral state C learning of this action declines 
to allow the Saf ety any rights in its ports other than 
those granted to vessels of war. 
(2) The fleet of Y fires upon and captures the Safety 
and takes it in to a port of Y. 
\Vhat action would existing la'v sustain in each of the 
u bove cases~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) 1. The private neutral seaplane alighting within 
the blockade lines should be seized. The proof of inno-
cence rests upon the seaplane. 
2. The private neutral seaplane alighting 50 1niles 
outside the blockade lines is not liable to seizure unless 
on grounds discovered by visit and search. 
(b) The military aircraft and crew should be interned 
by state B. 
(o) The armed private aircraft of state X should not 
be supplied with fuel in a port of R. 
(d) The use of tear gas by one belligerent against 
another is not prohibited, therefore the resort to the use 
of bacteriological bombs in retaliation is unlawful. 
(e) 1. Neutral state C, while not under obligation to 
pass upon the character of an act of a hospital ship of a 
belligerent, may treat such a ship as a vessel of war if 
convinced that the ship has forfeited its immunities. 
2. 1"'he capture of the Safety by the fleet of Y is law-
ful, but care should be taken to restrict the use of force 
to the minimum. 
XOTES 
Surface blookade.-\.Vhile it 1nust be adn1itted that 
blockade involving absolute prevention of access to the 
coast of the ene1ny has rarely, if ever, been possible, 
blockade involving danger to the party attempting to 
pass has been the rule except in paper blockades. 
As was said in 1899 in the case of the Olinde 
Rodrigues: 
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"To be binding, th~ blockade n1ust be kno,vn, and the blockad-
ieg force must be present; but is there any rule determining 
that the presence of a particular force is essential in order to 
render a blockade effective? 'Ve do not think so, but, on the 
contrary, that the test is whether the blockade is practically 
(~ffective, and that that is a question, though a ·mixed one, more 
of fact than of law. 
"The fourth maxhn of the Declaration of Paris (April 16, 
1856), was: 'Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; 
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent 
access to the coast of the enemy.' ::\Ianifestly this broad defini-
tion was not intended to be literally applied. The object was 
to correct the abuse, in the early part of the century, of paper 
blockades, where extensive coasts were put under blockade by 
proclamation, without the presence of any force, or an inadequate 
force, an·d the question of \Vhat might be sufficient force was 
r.ecessarily left to be determined according to the particular 
circun1stances." (174 U. S. 510.) 
Later in the same case it was said: 
"it cannot be that a vessel actually captured in atte1npting to 
enter a blockaded port, after warning entered on her log by 
a cruiser off that port only a few days before, could dispute the 
efficiency of the force to which she \vas subjected. 
"As we hold that an effective blockade is a blockade so 
effective as to make it dangerous in fact for vessels to attempt 
to enter the blockaded port, it follows that the question of ef-
fectiveness is not controlled by the number of the blockading 
force. In other words, the'-position cannot be maintained that 
one modern cruiser though sufficient in fact is not sufficient 
as matter of law." (Ibid.) 
That the nature o£ blockade was changing was ad-
mitted in 1899 and there ha Ye been further changes in 
the physical require1nents since that ti1ne. Referring 
further to the blockaded port o£ San Juan, P:orto 
Rico, where the Olinde Rodrigues 'vas seized it was 
said, 
"On July 14 and thereafter the port was blockaded by the 
armored cruiser New Orleans, \Vhose maximum speed was 
twenty-two knots, and her armament six 6-inch breech-loading 
rifles, four 4.7-inch breech-loading rifles, ten 6-pounders, four 
1.5-inch guns, corresponding to 3-pounders; four 3-pounders in 
the tops; four 37-millilnetre automatic guns, corresponding to 1-
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pounllei·s. The range of her guns was five and one half sea 
miles or six and a quarter statute mile~. If stationary. she 
could command a circle of thirteen Iniles in diameter; if moving, 
at maximum speed, ~he could coYer in fiye minutes any point 
on a circle of seYenteen 1niles diameter; anll in ten minutes 
any point on a cir('le of nineteen miles diameter; her electric 
search lights could ~weep the sea by night for ten 1niles di~­
tance: her motiYe 11ower tnade her independent of winds and 
currents: in these respects and in her arnHlment antl increased 
range of guns she so far suqms~ed in effecth·eness the olcl-
tinle war ships that it would be inadmissible to hold that eYen 
if a century ago more than one ship was belieYed to be re-
quired for an effectiYe blockade, therefore this cruiser was not 
sufficient to blockade this port." (Ibid.) 
It. would be difficult for a Yessel "·hich has been cap-
tured by a blockading force to 1naintain that the block-
ade 'Yas not effectiYe. 
It is further entirely conceiYable that a blockade for 
the purpose of preYenting access of bulky· articles 
n1ight be n1aintained as effectiYe "·hen s1nall articles 
might be taken in to the port by aircraft or subn1arines. 
Restrictions on 1.lse of ah·c1·ajt. 1899, 1907.-The use 
of aircraft had sufficiently developed at the end of the 
nineteenth century to bring it before the First Hague 
Peace Conference of 1899 and. at this conference. the 
discharge of projectiles fron1 balloons and analogous 
1nethods of warfare ''as prohibited for 5 years. \Yhile 
this period of prohibition expired during the Russo-
,} apanese ,, .... ar, both parties respected the prohibition to 
the end of the 1var. 
Progress in n1atters of aerial lUlYigation was so rapid 
that at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 
the states haYing large 1nilitary forces were unwilling 
to rene·w the prohibition of 1899. There 'Yere~ howeYer, 
1nany conferences upon Yarying aspects of aerial navi-
gation~ and 1nilitary plans recognized that the use of 
the air for "Tar purposes should be anticipated. 
The experience of the \"Vorld \\7ar gave rise to n1any 
questions in regard to the rights of aircraft as affecting 
both neutrals and belligerents at sea and on land. 
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The 1natter ·was brought before the legal advisers 
at the \V ashington Naval Conference, 1921-22, but was 
referred to the Com1nission o£ Jurists appointed under 
a resolution o£ the conference. 
This Co1nmission met at The Hague and concluded 
its report on February 19, 1923, particularly treating 
0£ the control o£ radio and aircraft in time o£ war. The 
rules o£ this report have never been £or1nally adopted, 
but are \veighty evidence o£ \Vhat may be considered 
reasonable conduct under conditions covered by the 
rules. 
Air and marine blockade.-That blockade by sur:face 
vessels may for certain purposes need the aid o£ air-
er~:ft to render it effective. under modern conditions is 
evident. I£, as is probable, wars o:f the :future are to 
use aircra.:ft, then the effectiveness o£ blockade \vill be 
measured by consideration o£ the factors entering into 
the blockade in which air as well as sur:face vessels art3 
involved. 
Upon this type o£ blockade Mr. J. M. Spaight in his 
discussion o£ the effectiveness o£ a blockade in the a!r, 
"assu1ning that neutral contiguous states \vould allo\v 
passage through their jurisdiction to the blockade-
running aircraft," says: 
"If a blockade is to be recognize(l as extended from the sea 
to tlle air aboYe, it n1ust be effective in the air as well as 
on the sea, but a clifterent degree of effectiveness will probably 
be demanded in the air, because of the greater cliffic:ulty of 
controlling passage in that element. Take, for instance, the 
blockade of a short extent of ene1ny coast surrounded on each 
side by a neutral coast. Access to such a coast by marine 
cra: t c:an easily be prevented, the line to be watched being, 
ex hypothesi, short; but, for that same reason, access by aircraft 
"·ould be extremely difficult to prevent, for, instead of attempting 
direct entry or exit, the blockade-running aircraft 'vould always 
approach or leave the blockaded area through neutral juris-
diction, into which the belligerent n1ilitary aircraft acting with 
the blockading 'varships could not follow them. Even where 
a long line of enemy coast is being blockaded, aircraft would 
still have an advantage in attempting entry or egress; they 
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would not be t ied to the ports, as n1arine craft are, but could 
r1ass in or cut anywhere, provided always that their radius 
of action was sufficient to enable them to reach a safe landing-
ground. 
'"The fact that aircraft could thus find a 'way round' would not 
make the blockade ineffective, within the formula of the Declara-
tion of Paris, nor entitle neutral States to claim that it should 
not be recognized as a legally existent blockade, the breach of 
which involved the condemnation of such aircraft as could in 
fact be captured. The fact that shi11s can 11ass (even in fairly 
cousiderable numbers, as did the blockade-runners in the Ameri-
ean \Yar of Secession) through the b-lockading cruisers is no 
g1 ound for holding the blockade to be ineffectiYe, lH'OYided that 
there is on the whole a real danger of capture for any individual 
vessel making the attempt. This principle will, no doubt, be 
recognized in a still greater degree in regard to aircraft, and 
it will be accepted as inevitable that the proportion of captures 
to successful evasions which would entitle neutrals to challenge 
the effectiveness of the blockade 1nnst be lower in their case 
t!Jan in that of ships." ( Spaight, Air Power and \Yar Rights, 
2d edition, p. 397.) 
(a) Bloclcade; mrface, subnwrine, and aircraft.-
The Declaration of Paris, 1856, proYides that "Block-
ades in order to be binding n1ust be effective." This 
provision w·as dra 'vn for the purpose of putting an end 
to so-called ''paper blockades." This declaration 1nade 
in 1856 referred to blockades in which surface ships 
'vere the custo1nary 1neans of rendering the closing of 
the ports effective. The san1e principle w·ould be gen-
erally applicable "·hether the proclan1ation was in re-
gard to a blockade on, over, or under the sea; to be 
binding the blockade should be effective. 
In 1899, ~Ir. Chief Jhstice Fuller, in the case of the 
Olinde Rodrigues, said, "To be binding, the blockade 
must be known, and the blockading force 1nust be pres-
ent; but is there any rule of law determining that the 
presence of a particular force is essential in order to 
render the blockade effective? -,~Ve do not think so, but 
on the contrary, that the test is whether the blockade 
is practically effective, and that that is a question, 
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though a Inixed one, 1nore of fact than of la,v." (174 
U. S. 510.) In general it has been considered that an 
effective blockade is one that renders access or egress 
froin the blockaded port dangerous, and that, in a case 
" ... here the craft that has atten1pted to pass the block-
ade and has been captured cannot establish that, it is 
not effective. The captured craft Inay, ho"~ever, plead 
on other grounds that it has not violated the blockade. 
The burden of such proof rests upon the captured 
craft. 
A blockade n1aintained by surface vessels only with-
out means of preventing or rendering dangerous the 
passage of aircraft or su'bn1arine would be a "paper 
blockade" insofar as such craft 'vere concerned even 
though proclailned to include these. 
Any seaplane 1net at sea by a vessel of war may be 
Yisited and searched to detern1ine its relation to the 
hostilities and it n1ay be treated according to the evi-
dence found. In recent years on account of in1proved 
1neans of con1n1unication it 'vould be difficult to prove 
Jgnorance. 
Aircraft in distress.-The rules for entry of surface 
vessels in distress 'vould not apply to aircraft. In the 
period before the \V or ld \V ar it was thought by son1e 
that aircraft 1night enter and sojourn in neutral juris-
diction under the Saine conditions as those prescribed 
for surface vessels. The practice of states 'vhile neutral 
in the \Vorld \\Tar from the Nether lands to China was 
to use the force at their disposal to intern belligerent 
aircraft entering their jurisdiction. Dutch gunners shot 
do,vn aircraft flying oYer Dutch territory. Other states 
did the saine. Disabled aircraft entering neutral juris-
diction 'vere usually detained and interned until the end 
of the war. Force 1najeu.re or distress were regarded as 
too indefinite to differentiate fro1n intentional entrance 
in case of aircraft and the accounts of aviators of the 
\Vorld \Var seen1 to justify the neutral practice of prohi-
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bition of entrance and internn1ent in case of violation 
of the prohibition. Articles 39, 40, and 42 of the Hague 
Rules of 1923 show the attitude of the Conunission of 
Jurists. 
".Article 2·9. Belligerent aircraft are bound to respect the 
rights of neutral powers ancl to abstain within the jurisdiction 
of a neutral State from the commission of any act "~hich it is 
the duty of that State to preYent. 
"Article 40. Belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to 
enter the jurisdiction of a neutral State." * * * 
".Article 42. A neutral Government n1ust use the means at its 
disposal to preYent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent 
Jnilitary aircraft and to compel thetn to alight if they haye 
entered such jurisdiction. 
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal 
to intern any belligerent 1nilitary aircraft which is within its 
jurisdiction after haYing alighted fo·r any reason whatsoyer, 
together with its crew and the passengers, if any." (1924 NaYal 
'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 131.) 
Internment of British seaplanes.-ln a Inen1oranclum 
of the British Foreign Office of nlay 31, 1916, the K eth-
erlands Govern1nent ''as requested to per1nit a seaplane 
which had been rescued and taken in by a Dutch lugger 
to be dispatched to Great Britain. Certain principles 
were set forth in this men1orandum: 
"A Seaplane belonging to His l\Iajesty's forces ·\YaS recently 
ohliged on account of engine trouble to descend while over the 
North Sea. The pilot "~as rescued by a Dutch fishing boat, 
"·hich took both him and the seaplane into a Dutch port. The 
Netherlands Government, though they have released the pilot, 
appear to consider it their duty to retain the seaplane for the 
duration of the war. After a careful consideration of the ques· 
tion, His ::\lajesty's Goyernment feel bound to dissent from this 
Yiew, and belieye that the Xetherlands Government are under 
no obligation to intern the ·machine. 
"The Netherlands Government, in releasing the pilot, appear 
to haye considered that he was in the same position as a member 
of the crew of a ship-wrecked belligerent "~arship who is picked 
up by a neutral merchant vessel and conyeyed to a neutral 
port; such a person, under the rules of The Hague ConYention 
No. 10, of 1907, is entitled to be released. His ::\Iajesty's Gov-
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crn1nent belieYe their decision on this point to be correct and 
consider that, while none of the rules expressly laid down by 
international law exactly fit the case of the seaplane, a further 
exan1ination of the principles which lie behind the rules which 
compel neutrals to intern belligerent forces in certain circum-
stances shows that the seaplane should also be released. 
"The rules concerning internment are not based on any one 
~ingle and uniform principle. This fact explains itself when 
0ne takes into consideration 1hat these rules have grown up 
gradually and seYerally and were, before the Peace Confer-
ence at The Hague in 1907, customarily agreed upon from dif-
ferent motives. The consequence is that the rules governing 
internment differ not only with regard to the intern1nent of 
soldiers on neutral land and internment of warships in neutral 
llarbours, but also with regard to the internment of troops in 
general, and the internment of such soldiers as have escaped 
from captivity. 
"One of the basic reasons for the rules concerning intern-
ment is no doubt the fact that a belligerent is entitled to insist 
that such enemy forces as have crossed neutral territory for 
the purpose of escaping capture, shall not be enabled to leave 
the neutral territory and again resort to hos1ilities. But this 
concerns only enenfy forces which have deliberately entered 
neutral territory for the purpose of escaping capture: it can-
not apply to such enemy forces as for other purposes cross into 
ueutral territory, or even cross accidentally without knowledge 
of the neu1ral frontier. No,v, all these must likewise be in-
terned, and the basic reason for their internment is that, in 
case these troops are not interned, the other belligerent would 
be justified in crossing into the neutral territory on his part 
and attacking the enemy there. 
"As regards the internment of men-of-war, the basic reasons 
are also manifold. One is-just as in the case of fugitive 
troops-that a belligerent is entitled to insist that enemy men-
of-war which deliberately enter neutral harbours for the pur-
pose of escaping capture, shall not after some length of time 
be allowed 1o leave and resort to hostilities again, although 
they may leave if they only stay twenty-four hours. Other rea-
sons are that a neutral must not allow belligerent men-of-war 
to make his harbours the base of military operations, the base 
of supply beyond a certain limit, the base for repairing vital 
damages, and the like." (Parliamentary Papers, 1\iiscellaneous, 
No. 4 [1918] Cd. 8985, p. 3; see also 1931 Naval War College, 
International Law Situations, pp. 14-22.) 
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rrhe Netherlands explained that under strict rules 
of neutrality, the Queen's GoYerninent, to their regret, 
\Yere unable to con1ply \Yith the request of the British 
GoYerninent until the end of the \Yar. 
Later in the case of the British seaplane 1.Vo. 1B32, 
\Yhich caine do\Yn in the North Sea, Septen1ber 23, 
1917, sixty 1niles off the Dutch coast and w·as rescued 
and to\Yed by a Dutch fishing Yessel to the Helder, the 
British clain1ed that the seaplane should be released a8 
\Yell as the personnel. The Dutch GoYennnent re-
leased the personnel, but declined to release the aircraft 
till the end of the \Yar. 
1.Vaval 1V ar 0 ollege discussion., 1926.-In referring to 
intern1nent during the \'T oriel \'Tar, it \vas said in the 
solution of situation III, 1926, that: 
'·During the Vt" oriel 'Var for the first time the question of air-
craft in relation to neutral jurisdiction beeame one of great 
practical importan~e. 'Yhile practice was not, at first, in every 
instance uniform, gradually it came to be o1:ecognized that bel-
ligerent aircraft .bad no right to enter neutral jurisdiction. Some 
of the neutral states for a time questioned the necessity of deny-
ing entry to aircraft, and considered permitting entry on tenns 
analogous to those a11plied to maritime vessels of war. Switzer-
land nnd the Netherlands, from their geographical position as . 
ueutral islands surrounded by belligerents, had to face the JH'ob-
lem in n1ore varied tnanifestations. Both states 1naintained the 
right to use necessary force to prevent entrance of belligerent 
aircraft or even to intern aircraft entering under force maje11re. 
Djsabled belligerent air~raft, aircraft trying to escape frmn the 
enemy, aircraft lost in fog or stonn, "·ere· with their personnel 
forced to land and interned by neutral states. Early in the "~ar 
there was some uncertainty in regard to hydro11Ianes in Xorway, 
and later Denmark permitted some German deserters to remain 
flfter entering Dani~.h jurisdiction in ri stolen aircraft. The 
Netherlands interned A1nerican aircraft alighting within Dutch 
jurisdiction after a battle over the high sea with Germany. The 
Swiss authorities similarly interned American fliers when return-
ing from an observation flight and forced by motor trouble to 
land within Swiss jurisdiction. There were many cases in which 
tlle crews were interned "·ben the aircraft 'vere destroyed either 
intentionally or by accident. "r,hen aircraft personnel "·as 
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rescued on the high seas and brought "·ithin neutral jurisdic-
tion, the practice was usually to release then1." (1926 ~aval 
'Yar College, International Law Situations. p. 100.) 
(b) Aircraft.-The treatment of military aircraft 
alighting ·within neutral jurisdiction "for any reason 
"~hatsoeYer" 'vas discussed at The Hague in the Com-
Inission of Jurists in 1923 and in n1eetings of other 
bodies since that ti1ne. The eon census of opinion has 
been that the duty of internment of n1ilitary aircraft 
is eYen more i1nperative than that to intern troops 
entering neutral jurisdiction. 
Article 53, Hague Rules, 1923.-· The report of the 
Conunission of Jurists~ February 19~ 1923, contained as 
article 53 regulations under which neutral private air-
craft were liable to capture. 'Vhile these rules have 
not been internationall}' adopted, they embody n1any 
accepted principles of international law . 
. A.rticle 53 provides that: 
"A neutral priYate aircraft is liable to capture if it * * *. 
" (a) Resists the legitimate exercise of belligerent rights. 
"(b) Violates a prohibition of which it has had notice issued 
by a belligerent com1nanding officer under article 30. 
" (c) Is engaged in unneu tral service. 
" (d) Is armed in time of war when outside the jurisdiction 
of its own country. 
" (e) Has no external marks or uses false marks. 
" (f) Has no papers or insufficient or irregular papers. 
"(g) Is n1anifestly out of the line between the point of de-
parture and the point of destination indica ted in its papers 
and a.fter such enquiries as the belligerent may deem necessary, 
no good cause is shown for the de-viation. The aircraft, to-
gether with its crew and passengers, if any, may be detained 
l•y the belligerent, pending such enquiries. 
"(h) Carries, or itself constitutes, contraband of war. 
" ( i) Is engaged in breach of a blockade duly established 
aw1 effectiYe1y Inaintained. 
"(k) lias been transferred from belligerent to neutral na-
tionality at a elate ancl in circu1nstances indicating an intention 
of eYading the (•onsequences to which an enemy aircraft, as 
such, is exposed. 
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"Provided that in each case (excevt (k)) the ground for 
capture shall be an act carried out in the flight in which the 
neutral aircraft came into belligerent hands, i. e., since it 
left its point of departure and before it reached its point of 
destination." (10:2-! Xaval 'Yar College, International Law Doc-
uments, p. 146.) 
Paragraph (i) of these rules 'Yas quite fully dis-
cussed by the Co1n1nission, and their report sho,Ys the 
trend of the discussion. 
"(i) The ninth ground for capture is that the aircraft is en-
gaged in a breach of blockade. 'Blockade' is here used in the 
same sense in which it is e1nployed in Chapter 1 of the Decla-
ration of London, that is to say, an operation of war for the 
purpose of preventing by the use of warships ingress or egress 
of conunerce to or frmn a defined portion of the enemy's 
coast. It has no reference to a blockade enforced without the 
use of warships, nor does it cover 1nilitary investnwnts of I1ar-
ticular localities on land. These operations, \Yhich nwy be 
termed 'aerial blockade,' were the subject of special examina-
tion by the experts attached to the various Delegations, who 
fra1ned a special report on the subject for consideration by the 
Full Commission. The conditions conte1npla ted in this sub-
head are those of warships enforcing a blockade at sea with 
aircraft acting in co-operation with them. As the primary ele-
nlents of the blockade will, therefore, be 1naritime, the recog-
nized principles applicable to such blockade, as for instance, 
that it 1nust be effective (Declaration of Paris, article 4), 
and that it 1nust be duly notified and its 11recise limits fixed, 
will also apply. This is intended to be shown by the use of 
the words 'breach of blockade duly established and effectively 
maintained' in the text of the sub-head. 
"It is too early yet to indicate with precision the extent to 
which the co-operation of aircraft in the maintenance of block-
ade at sea may be possible; experience alone can show. Never-
theless, it is necessary to indicate the sense in which the Com-
mission has used the word 'effective.' As pointed out in the 
Declaration of London, the effectiveness of a blockade is a 
question of fact. The word 'effective' is intended to ensure that 
it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent 
access to the enem~· coast-line. The prize court may, for instance. 
have to consider what proportion of surface vessels can escape 
the watchfulness of the blocka'ding squadrons without endanger-
ing the effectiveness of the blockade; this is a question which the 
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prize court alone can determine. In the san1e way, this question 
may have to be considered where aircraft are co-operai:!ng in 
the 1naintenance of a blockade. 
"The invention of the aircraft cannot impose upon a belligeren~ 
'vho desires to institute a blockade the obligation to employ 
aircraft in cooperation 'vith his naval forces. If he do~~ not 
do so, the effectiveness. of the blockade would not be affected 
by failure to stop aircraft passing through. It is only where the 
belligerent endeavors to render his blockade effective in the 
air-space above the sea as well as on the surface itself that 
captures of aircraft will be made and that any question of the 
effectiveness of the blockade in the air could arise. 
"The facility with "·hich an aircraft, desirous of entering the 
blockaded area, could evade the blockade by passing outside the 
geographical limits of the blockade has not escaped the atten-
tion of the C01nmission. This practical question may affect 
the extent to which belligerents will resort to blockade in future, 
but it does not affect the fact that where a blockade has been 
establishe'd and an aircraft attempts to pass through into the 
blockaded area within the lilnits of the blockade, it should be 
liable to capture. 
"The Netherlands Delegation proposed to suppress (i) on the 
grounds that air blockade could not be effectively 1naintained, 
basing its opinion on its interpretation of the experts' report 
on the subject. 
"The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegations voted 
for its maintenance. The American Delegation voted for its 
maintenance ad referendum~." (Ibid., p. 144.) 
Armed private aireraft.-The Hague Comn1ission o:f 
1923 also gave consideration to the arming o:f private 
aircra:ft and expressed the opinion that the interests o:f 
all would be better served i:f the arming o:f private air-
era:ft should be prohibited. Since 1923 this opinion has 
been repeatedly confirmed because giving rise to many 
possible n1isunderstandings and there has been intro-
duced the general understanding that public aircraft 
only may be ar1ned. 
(c) Military aircraft in neut1~az jurisdiction.-While · 
there is still doubt in regard to the obligations of a 
neutral state in respect to private aircraft o:f a bel-
ligerent nationality, the rules of the Hague Co1nmis-
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sion of Jurists of 1923 are generally considered as bind-
ing as to public and 1nilitary aircraft. These rules of 
the Hague Conunission 'Yere based on a draft sub-
Inittecl by the .. A.1nerican delegation. 
The report of the Conunission in conunenting on this 
article says, 
"The l1l'OYision in the article is limited to military aircraft be-
cause it is only in respect of such craft that the prohibition on 
entry is absolute. Under article 12 the admission of priYate or 
11ublic non-military aircraft is within the discretion of the neu-
tral State. 'Yhere such aircraft penetrate \Yithin neutral juris-
diction in Yiola tion of t.be n1easures prescribed by the neutral 
Po"·er, they \Yill be subject to such 11enalties as the neutral 
Power may enact; these Inay or may not include internment. 
Recognition of this fact has enabled the Commission to omit a 
provision which figured as article 11 in the American draft: 
'A neutral GoYernment 1nay intern any aircraft of belligerent 
nationality not conforming to its regulations.' 
''The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern 
(·oYers not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. 
The obligation is not affected by the circun1stance which led to 
the Inilitary aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies 
whet.her the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction, 
Yoluntarily or involuntarily, and whateYer the cause. It is an 
obligation owed to the 011posing belligerent and is based upon the 
fact that the aircraft bas come into an area where it is not 
subject to attack by its opponent. 
"The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft 
are those alising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates 
to flying ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board 
}l warship is deemed to be part of her, and therefore will fol-
low the fate of that warship if she . enters neutral ports or 
'-Yater:-:. If she enters under circumstances which render her 
immune from internment, such aircraft will likewise escape 
internn1en t. 
"The obligation to intern belligerent n1ilitary aircraft enter-
ing- neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern 
the personnel. These will in general be combatant members of 
the belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown 
that in time of war n1ilitary aeroplanes are employed for trans-
porting passengers. As it may safely be assumed that in time 
of war a passenger would not be carried on a belligerent mili-
tary aircraft unless his journey was a 1naHer of importanc~ to 
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the Government, it seems reasonable also to comprise such 
passengers in the category of persons to be interned." ( Ibid, 
p. 133.) 
Retaliation.-Particularly during and since the 'Vorld 
''Tar the idea of retaliation has recei Yed rene"yed a tten-
tion. Retaliation \Yas before 1914 regarded as in the 
reahn of acts not in accord \Yith internationalla'' 'vhich 
n1ight be resorted to against an opponent "yho in \var 
disregarded the la\v of \var. Retaliatory 1neasures ·were 
to be strictly limited to re1nedying the breach of the 
law by the enemy and to be directed toward the enemy 
though a neutral 1night be inconvenienced or even inci-
dentally injured, but the act of retaliation should not be 
ai1ned at the neutral or directly restrict the rights of a 
neutral. It \vas adn1itted that the la'v of contraband, 
blockade, and unneutral serYice did limit the peacetime 
rights of a neutral state, but these restrictions were gen-
t:rally accepted. 
Retaliation has usually been threatened or resorted 
to \Yhen ne\Y 1nethods or 1neans of ''ar ha Ye con1e into 
use. '"l'hreats \Yere made in the Franco-Prussian ,, .... ar, 
1870, that balloons \Youlcl be treated. as spies, and in the 
Russo-Japanese ,, .... ar, 190-!--5, that new·spaper corre-
spondents using radio \Yould be treated as spies. Dur-
ing the '''?" orld ,, .... ar there \Yere n1any propositions to 
the effect that a Yiators, if ca pturecl, should be hanged or 
in11nediately shot, or in any case, should be treated as 
cri1ninals. Sin1ilar propositions \Yere adYanced in re-
gard to the personnel of snb1narines regardless of their 
conduct. 
In the ti1ne of 'Yar there is al '"ays a ready response 
to ru1nors of unlawful conduct on the part of an op-
ponent. Propaganda and \Yar hysteria, serYe to 1nake 
de1nands for retaliation or for reprisals popular and 
to n1ake pictures of ene1ny disregard of la'' readily 
accepted. 
''Thile there haYe been atte1npts to regulate in son1e 
degree reprisals on land by international conYentions, 
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such conYentions hnYe not been fonnnlly extended to 
1naritin1e and aerial \Yarfnre. It \Youlcl, ho,yever, be 
safe to nssu1ne that in principle the snn1e ln'Y \vould 
apply over, on, and in the sen. 
The late Prof. A. Pearce Higgins, \Yho aided in pre-
paring son1e of the nrgtunents for the British Govern-
Inent in prize cases, after the cases of the Zan1ora, 
Leona1?a, and Stigstad, proposed the follo\ving bases for 
considern tion: 
"1. Retaliation is a right of the belligerent "\Yhich must be exer-
<'ised only after the greatest proYoca tion, and as a last resort. 
"2. Retaliatory 1neasures must primarily be directed only 
against the enemy and need not be of an identical character 
with the wrong c01nplained of. 
"3. In the exercise of retaliation the fundamental laws of 
bun1anity n1ust be obserYed. 
"4. In all cases of retaliation which inYolYe inconvenience or 
detrilnent to neutrals, Prize Courts of the belligerents should 
l1a\e jurisdiction both to enquire into the facts alleged as giving 
rise to the retaliatory measures, and also to decide "\Yhether the 
means adopted inflict on neutrals a degree of inconvenience in 
excess of that necessary to terminate the alleged illegalities. 
"5. Neutrals should be allowed compensation in all cases 
"\Vhere there is undue delay in dealing with their cases in the 
belligerent Prize Courts under retaliatory orders, or where ship 
or cargo is released in consequence of an erroneous application 
of the order. 
"6. Retaliatory orders, since they are in derogation of the 
general rules of law, 1nust, in case of ambiguity of language, be 
construed against the states issuing then1." (Pearce Higgins, 
International Law and Relations, p. 237.) 
Protocol on gases~ 1925.-At the \Vashington Con-
ference on the Li1nitntion of Ar1na1nent. 1921-22, the 
proposal to li1nit the use of gas \vas coupled \vith regu-
lations in the use of sub1narines. The Advisory Board 
of the A1nerican delegation sub1nitted a report from its 
subcommittee on new agencies of \varfare which con-
tained the following: 
"Resolved, That chemical warfare, including the use of gases, 
whether toxic or nontoxic, should be prohibited by internationa1 
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agreement, and should be classed with such unfair n1ethods of 
warfi1re as poisoning 'Yells, introducing germs of disease, and 
other methods tb.a t are abhorrent in modern "·arfare." (Con-
ference on the Limitation of Armament, 'Vashington, November 
12, 1921-February 6, 192.2, p. 732.) 
The French version of this resolution ""aS as follo,vs : 
"II est decide: Que la guerre chimique, cmnprenan t l'usage 
des gaz, to:s:iques ou non toxiques, devraft etre interdite par un 
rtccord international, et classee parmi les methodes de guerre 
deloyales, telles que l'empoisonnement des puits, la propagation 
de germes de maladies et autres n1ethodes execrables de la guerre 
modern e." (Ibid, p. '733.) 
It will be observed that the :form in both languages 
is "toxic or nontoxic." The chairman of the conference, 
Ivfr. Secretary Hughes, also called attention to a report 
of the General Board of the United States Navy in 
'vhich, referring to the question "Should gas warfare be 
prohibited," it was stated : 
"4. The two principles in warfare, (1) that unnecessary suf-
fering in the destruction of combatants should be avoided, (2) 
that innocent noncombatants should not be destroyed, have been 
accepted by the civilized world for more than one hundred years. 
The use of gases in warfare in so far as they violate these. two 
principles is almost universally condemned to-day, despite its 
practice for a certain period during the world war. 
''5. Certain gases, for example, tear gas, could be used without 
violating the two principles above cited. Other gases will, no 
doubt, be invented which could be so employed; but there will 
be great difficulty in a clear and definite demarcation between 
the lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suffering 
as distinguished from those gases which simply disable tempo-
rarily. Among the gases existing to-day there is undoubtedly a 
difference of opinion as to the class to which certain gases 
belong. 1\Ioreover, the diffusion of all these gases is practically 
beyond control and many innocent non-combatants would share 
in the suffering of the war, even if the result did not produce 
death or a permanent disability. 
"6. The General Board foresees great difficulty in clearly limit-
ing gases so as to avoid unnecessary suffering in gas warfare 
and in enforcing rules .which will avert suffering or the possible 
destruction of innocent lives of noncombatants, including women 
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and children. Gas warfare threatens to bec01ne so efficient as to 
endanger the Yery existence of ciYilization. 
"7. The General Board belieYes it to be sound 11olicy to prohibit 
gas ·warfare in e\ery form and against eYers objectiYe, and so 
recommends." (Ibid, p. 734.) 
Reference in the discussion ·was n1ade to article 171 
of the Treaty of \T ersailles, J nne 28, 1919, \vhich as ap-
plying to gas in the English and French is: 
"The use of asphyxiating, 11oisonous or other gases and all 
the analogous liquids, 1naterials or deYices being prohibited, 
their 1nanufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in 
Germany." 
"The sa1ne applies to materials specially intended for the 
manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices." 
(Ibid, p. 738.) 
"L'en1ploi des gaz asphyxiants, to:;\:iques ou similaires, ainsi 
que de tous liquides, matieres ou procedes analogues, etant 
prohibe la fabrication et !'importation en sont rigoureusement 
interclites en Allen1agne. 
''II en est de me1ne du materiel speciale1nent destine a la 
fabrication, a la conser,ation on a l'usage desdits produits ou 
procecU~s." (Ibid, p. 739.) 
A convention e1nbodying this principle w·as dra\Yll 
up at the ''r ashingion Conference, but did not beco1ne 
effectiYe been use not ratified by all the po,yers. 
In 1925, ho\YeYer, a protocol relating to gns onl~T \Yas 
opened for signature at GeneYa, and a large nu1nber of 
ratifications or adhesions haYe been deposited. The 
parts of this protocol referring particularly to the 
conduct of war are in English and French as follows: 
"'\Yhereas the use in war of a~ph~·xiating. 110isonons or other 
gases, and of all analog-ous liquicls material~ or deY ices. has 
been justly conden1netl by the general 011inion of the ciYilized 
world; and 
"'\Yhereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in 
Treaties to whkh the majorit;\· of Powers of the world are 
Parties; and 
'''l.',o the e1Hl that this l1l'Ohibition ~hall be uniYersally ac-
cepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the con-
science and the practice of nations; · 
DECL..-\P.E: 
"That the I-Iigh Contracting Parties. so far as they are not 
already Parties to Treaties 11rohibiting such use, accept this 
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prohibition, agree to extend this vrohibition to the use of bac-
teriological methods of wnrfai·e and agree to be hound as be-
tween them~elYes according to the terms of this declaration." 
(9-! League of Xations Treaty Series, p. 65.) 
''Considerant que l'eD111loi a la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, 
toxiques ou silnilaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matieres ou 
procedes nnalogues, a ete a juste titre condarnne par l'opinion 
generale du 1noncle civilise; 
"Considerant que !'interdiction de cet en111loi a ete formulee 
dans des traites auxquels sont Parties la plupart des Puis-
sances cln monde; 
"Dans le dessein de faire uniYersellement reconnaitre comme-
incoq1oree au droit international cette interdiction, qui s'impose· 
eg:alement a la conscience et a la }1l'atique des nations, 
''DECLAREXT: 
''Que les Hautes Parties contractantes, en tant qu'elles ne 
sont pas deja parties a des traites prohibant cet emploi, 
reconnaissent cette interdiction, acceptent d'etendre cette inter-
diction d'emploi aux n1oyens de guerre bacteriologiques: et 
conyiennent de se considerer connne liees entre elles aux termes 
de cette declaration." (Ibid, p. 65.) 
It would seem that the prohibition in English in the 
words "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases" is not 
identical with the French "gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou 
similaires." The English would seem to be a general 
prohibition o:f the use o:f gas while the French would 
prohibit gases o:f specific types. Both would prohibit 
bacteriological warfare. 
It could scarcely be asserted even in 1925 that the use 
o:f all kinds o:f gases "had been condemned by the gen-
eral opinion o:f the civilized 'vorld." Indeed smoke 
screens and si1nilar n1ethods were then and are no\v 
approved. It 1nay be difficult to make a legal distinc-
t ion between sn1oke in the eyes o:f an enemy and a 
gas that may ·cause tears, while neither may cause suf-
fering which the protocol aims to prohibit and which 
"has been justly conde1nned by the general opinion of 
the civilized 'Yorld." 
Treaty of Versailles, arrticle· 171.-The treaty o£ Ver-
~ailles though signed by a large number o:f states was 
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not ratified by all the signatories, and son1e of its pro-
Yisions have for various reasons beco1ne inoperative . 
.. t\ . .rticle 171 in the French and English versions of 
the 'l"'reaty of \T ersailles is as follo,vs: 
"A.RTICLEJ 171." 
"L'emploi des gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi 
que de tous liquides, matieres ou procedes analogues, etant 
prollibe, la fabrication et !'importation en sont rigoureuse1nent 
interdites en Allemagne. 
"II en est de meme du n1ateriel specialement destine a la fabri-
cation, a la conservation ou a rusage desclits produits ou pro-
cedes. 
"Sont egalen1ent prohibees la fabrication. et !'importation en 
Allemagne des chars blindes, tanks ou de tout autre engin simi-
Iaire pouvant servir a d_es buts de guerre." 
"ARTICLE 171." 
"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all 
analogous liquids, 1naterials or devices being prohibited, their 
n1anufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. 
"The same applies to materials specially intended for the 
manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices. 
"The n1anufacture and the in1portation into Germany of 
armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for 
use in war are also prohibited." 
\Vhile the accuracy of the translation of the article 
n1ay be open to question, the English forn1 does not seen1 
to conforn1 to international law because there are son1e 
gases other than asphyxiating and poisonous, the use of 
which is not prohibited in war. If a gas causes unneces-
sary suffering, its use would be considered contrary to 
jnternationalla,v. The use of a tear gas bo1nb n1ight be 
preferred to a projectile that "\Vould result in asphyxiat-
jng the personnel of the vessel of 'var by dro,vning, and 
tear gas has not yet been included in the list of pro-
hibited gases. 
B ornbardment from aircraft.-Regulations in regard 
to the discharge of projectiles fron1 aircraft have been 
n1ade. None are now generally accepted unless it be 
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admitted that an a1nendn1ent in La,vs and Customs of 
VV ar on Land of 1907 by which it 'vas thought by so1ne 
the. prohibition of undefended towns was extended to 
operations of aircraft. The 1899 convention had pro-
hibited bombardment of undefended "towns, villages, 
habitations, or buildings." The 1907 inserted the 'vords 
"by any n1eans whatever." This would not in any case 
apply to dropping bo1nbs on a vessel of war. 
The proposed Hague rules of 1923 in regard to aerial 
·warfare in article 24 provide : 
"1. Aerial bombardment is legitilnate only when directed at a 
military objective, that is to say, an object of which the de-
struction or injury would constitute a distinct military ad-
vantage to the belligerent. 
"2. Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed ex-
clusively at the following objectives: military forces; military 
works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting 
important and "·ell-known centres engaged in the manufacture 
of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of 
communication or transportation used for military purposes. 
"3. The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations 
of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives 
specified in paragraph 2 are so situated that they cannot be 
b01nbarded without the indiscri,minate bOinbardment of the 
cjvilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment. 
"4. In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land 
forces, the bombardment of cities, to\vns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable 
presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently im-
portant to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger 
thus caused to the civilian population. 
"5. A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for 
injuries to person or to property caused by the violation by any 
of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article." (1924 
Naval War College, International Law Documents, p. 120.) 
Attention on this article 'vas particularly fixed upon 
land warfare and the report of the Co1nn1ission of 
Jurists explains the article as follo"rs: 
"Agreement on the following article specifying the objects 
which may legitimately be bombarded from the air was not 
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reached without prolonged discussion. Xumerons 11ropo~.ah:; were 
put forward by the various delegations before unanimity was 
l1ltinlately attaine<l. The text of these IH'Ol10Snls will be found 
in the Ininntes. In particular, Inention mny be made ot" an 
Italian pro1w~al of the Sth Fl'bruan·, on whieh the text ulti-
nately ad011ted was in great part founded. Regret was expressed 
by some delegations that a more far-reaching lH'ohibition did not 
meet with unanimous acceptance. 
"'l'he terms of the article are so clear that no explanation 
of the provi~ions is necessary, but it 1nay be 'vell to state that 
in the phrase in paragraph 2 'military establishments or de-
pots' the word 'depots' is intended to cover all collections of 
supplies for n1ilitary use which haYe passed into the possession 
of the 1nilitary authorities and are ready for delivery to the 
forces, 'distinctively militar;\· supplies' in the succeeding phrase is 
intended to cover those which by their nature show that they 
are certainly man ufacturecl for 1nili tary purposes. 
"If the code of rules of aerial warfare should eventually be 
annexed to a conYention, paragraph 5 of the article would find a 
n1ore appropriate place in the conyention. 
"It will be noticed that for aerial b01nbardn1ent the test 
adopted in article 25 of the Land 'Varfare Regulations, that of 
the town, &., being defended, is abandoned. The nature of the 
objective or the use to 'vhich it is being put now bec01nes the 
test." (Ibid.) 
There would be no question that a Yessel of ·war "\vould 
be and has been regarded as a n1ilitary objective. 
Proposals before the conference for the 1·eduction and 
lhnitation of a·r1nantents, 1932.-Numerous proposals 
"\Yere presented to the conference com1nonly referred to 
as the "Disarinainent Conference." 
On February 5, 1932, the French delegation in the 
prea1nble to certain proposals stated : 
"The Government of the Republic. conscious of the gravity 
of the problen1 to be soh·ed, is convinced that, in accordance 
with previous work of the League of Nations, the Conference 
should deal with this problen1 as a part of general policy. 
"This is all the 1nore important since it n1eets at a time of 
economic and moral tension, at a time of general disturbance 
and uneasines~, when events e1nphasize the absolute necessity 
of a better organisation in a tormented world. 
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"The Governn1ent of the Republic is anxious to honor the 
pron1ise contained in its memorandum of July 15th, 1931, ann 
to reply to the repeated appeals made by the League of Na-
tions, notably in the resolution of the Assembly of 1927. It 
intends thus to fulfil a double duty. 
"It assumes that, on the basis of the draft Convention of 
19-30, action will be taken with the least possible delay. 
"Further, it presents herewith proposals for placing civil 
aviation and bombing aircraft, and also certain material of 
land and na\al forces, at the disposal of the League of Nations; 
for the creation of a preventive and puniti\e international 
force; for the political conditions upon which such measure:; 
depend ; and, lastly, for new rules providing for the protection 
of civil population." (League of Nations PubliGations, ConE. 
D. 56, 1931. IX. p. 1.) 
The French Government proposed that civil aviation 
and bo1nbing aircraft be placed at the disposal o£ the 
League o:f Nations. In the detailed provisions o£ the 
French propo~als, it 'yas stated: 
"In addition to the preceding 11r0Yisions, the GoYernment of 
the Republic 11roposed the arlo11tion of the following rules which 
can be adopted unconditionally: 
" (a) The use by aeroplanes and by land or na Yal artillery of 
projectiles which are specifically incendiary or which contain 
poison gases or bacteria is forbidden, whate\er the objectiYe." 
(Ibid., p. 3.) 
The Ger1nan delegation also submitted certain pos-
itive proposals on February 18, 1932: 
"17. The maintenance of air forces of any kind is forbidden. 
The total air force n1a terial which has so ·far been either in 
serYice or in reserve or on stock shall be destroyed, except 
those armaments which are to be incorporated in the quanti-
ties allowed for land and na,Tal forces. 
"18. The dropving of bOinbs or any other objects or 1naterials 
serving n1ilitary purposes from aircraft, as well as all prepara-
tions to this effect shall be forbidden without any exception. 
"19. \Vith a view to strictly enforcing the prohibition of any 
military aviation, the following shall, inter alict, be forbidden. 
" (a) Any instruction and training of any person in a Yia tion 
having a n1ilitary character or a military purpose." (Ibid., 
Con f. D. 79. IX. 1932, p. 3.) 
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rrhe Soviet delegation Blade the nlOSt COlnprehensive 
proposal to the effect that the real organization for peace 
and security would be through "the general con1plete 
and rapid abolition of all arn1ed forces." 
The Italian delegation proposed the abolition of both 
aircraft carriers ·and bo1nbing aircraft. 
Other states proposed the prohibition of military 
a Yia.tion and of the use of bombs from aircraft. 
Even the A1nerican delegation on February 18, 1932, 
indicated that the Gover1unent \Yould "join in fornlulat-
ing the n1ost effective 1neasures to protect civilian popu-
lations against aerial bon1bing." 
The Japanese delegation 1nade a sin1ilar proposition 
and would also prohibit aircraft-landing platfor1ns and 
aircraft carriers. 
(d) Use of ga~.-As military aircraft only are enti-
tled to exercise belligerent rights, the rights thus exer-
cised should be li1nited to those of la\vful warfare. The 
use of poisonous gases and those that cause unnecessary 
suffering is in general prohibited. The use of smoke 
screens and of tear gas has not been included in the 
category of prohibited acts, but the use of bacteriological 
\Varfare has been prohibited. 
Hospital ships in lV o•rld lV ar.-There were many 
charges and counter-charges in regard to the misuse of 
hospital ships during the \"Vorld \Var. The French 
Govern1nent even announced that its hospital ships 
\vould carry a certain ntunber of Gern1an officers who 
had been n1ade prisoners of war, and in retaliation the 
German Gover1unent announced that it would expose 
French officers in the \var zone on land. In the l\iediter-
l'anean the controversy was adjusted by an agree1nent 
in Septe1nber 1917 that a Spanish officer should acconl-
pany the hospital ship in order to see th~t the Hague 
eonvention should be observed. The experience of the 
\"Vorld \"Var sho\ved that in spite of revisions, the 
Geneva convention should have still further revision to 
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1neet ne'v and changing conditions of warfare. Such 
questions arise as: 'Vhat should be the degree of sick-
ness entitling a military n1an to travel upon a hospital 
ship; how far may hospital ships evacuate crowded 
hospitals on land; might a transport ship on an outward 
voyage to the seat of war act as a hospital ship carrying 
sick and wounded on its return? ' 
In general the tendency during the \V or ld vVar was 
to interpret convention X strictly and to confine the 
action of the ships to "assisting the wounded, sick, and 
ship,vrecked", and not including those 'vounded or sick 
on land by evacuating land hospitals. 
The "Orel", 1904.-The Orel (Aryol), a stea1ner be-
longing to the Russian volunteer fleet, "ras chartered at 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese \V ar as a hospital 
ship to serve the Russian Red Cross. Japan w·as noti-
fied, and assented to this action. 
En route to the Far East, the Orel on one occasion 
conveyed instructions from the co1mnander in chief to 
one of the ships of the squadron. She w·as also in-
structed to purchase insulated wire in Cape Town .. 
After arrival in Far Eastern waters, she took on board 
the uninjured captain and three 1ne1nbers of the cre'v of 
5hip "rhich had been destroyed by a vessel of w·ar of the 
Russian fleet. In approaching the Straits of Tsushin1a, 
the 01"el 'vas in the position of a fleet reconnaissance 
vessel, and 'vas stopped and taken to the Japanese prize 
court. 
The conclusion of the Court is as follows : 
"A hospital ship is only exempt from capture if she fulfils 
certain conditions and is engaged solely in the humane work 
of aiding the sick and 'vounded. That she is liable to capture, 
should she be used by the enemy for military purposes, is 
admitted by International Law, and is clearly laid down by the 
stipulations of The Hague Convention No. 3 of July 29th, 1899, 
for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the 
Geneva Convention of August 22nd, 1864. Although the "Orel" 
l1ad been lawfully equipped and due notification concerning her 
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bad been gi\en by the Russian Goyernment to the Japanese 
GoYernment, yet her action in communicating the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron 
to other Yessels during her eastward voyage with the squadron, 
and her attempt to carry persons in good health, i. e., the 
nu1ster and three other members of the crew of a British 
steamship captured by the Hussian fleet, to Yladiyostock, which 
i:s a na\al port in enemy territon·, were eYiclently acts in aid 
cf the military operations of the enemy. Further, "·hen the 
f8.cts that she "·as instructed by the Russian squadron to pur-
chase munitions of war, and that she occupied the position 
usually assigned to a ship engaged in reconnaissance, are taken 
in consideration, it is reasonable to assume that she was con-
stantly employed for n1ilitary puq1oses on behalf of the Russian 
squadron. She is, therefore, not entitled to the exemptions laid 
down in The Hague Conyention for the adaptation to maritime 
warfare of the principles of the GeneYa ConYention, and may 
be condemned according to International Law." (2 Hurst and 
Bray, Russia and Japanese Prize Cases, p. 354.) 
The "Ophelia", 191.1;.-The Ophelia W'as a German 
auxiliary 1nilitary hospital ship, 1net in the North Sea 
October 18, 1914, and taken on suspicion to a British 
port 'vhere she 'vas detained as prize. The Ophelia was 
conden1ned as prize on l\Iay 21, 1915, on the ground that 
'"she ""aS adapted and used as a signaling ship for Jnili-
tary purposes." 'The case "·as appealed to the Judicial 
Conunittee of the Privy Council w·here a decision was 
rendered l\Iay 8, 1916. 
Particular reference 'vas 1nade to articles 1 and 8 of 
Hague ConYention 10 of 1907. 
"ART. 1. J\Iilitary hospital ships, that is to say, ships con-
structed or adapted by States wholly and solely with a Yiew 
to aiding the wounded, sick, and shipwTecked, the na1nes of 
which haYe been communicated to the belligerent Powers, shall 
be respected and cannot be captured. 
"ART. 8. The protection to which hospital ships are entitled 
ceases if they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy. 
'!,he presence of wireless telegraphy apparatus on board is not 
<I suflicient reason for withdrawing protection." 
It "ras stated in this case that the only question in the 
nature of a point of la'v 'Yas as to the presence of a. 
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wireless telegraphy apparatus. The for1nalities con-
stituting the Ophelia a hospital ship had been 1net. 
Question arose as to 'vhether the Ophelia ·was "" .. holly 
and solely" fitted as a hospital ship. 
'L'he opinion of Con1n1ancler N e'vn1an " .. as stated: 
•·In the opinion of Connnander Xewman, who had special 
exper1ence in the fitting of hospital ships, the Ophelia was not 
only unsuitable for use as a hospital ship, but was undoubtedly 
fitted and intended for signalling purposes. He came to that 
conclusion without knowing that the ship was suspected of acting 
as a signalling ship, and \vhen he had n1erely been instructed to 
report on her suitability as a hospital ship." ( [1916] 2 A. C. 
206.) 
The opinion in the juclg1nent ren1arkecl that-
"It is obvious that there could hardly be a greater or more 
dangerous abuse of the privileges of a hospital ship· than the 
communicating to the naval authorities of her nation informa-
tion which she would be constantly in a position to obtain by 
virtue of her immunity. Her signalling avparatus ought to be 
confined strictly to what would be necessary for receiving in-
struction as to her duties and for calling for assistance in the 
perfor1nance of them and such like legitimate purposes. That 
the risk of such abuse was present to the minds of the framers 
of the Hague Coll'vention is shown by the 1nention of wireless 
telegraphy. Instead of the signalling apparatus and equipment 
of the Ophelia being confined within the narrow limits necessary 
for a lJona fide hospital ship, it \vas obviously very largely in ex-
cess of them. * * * It is, however, the enormous number of 
Yen·'s ~ignal lights which were on board which seemed to the 
President, and seems also to the Board, practically conclusive 
that the vessel was specially equipped for signalling. These 
lights are fired fro1n a special kind of pistol, of which there 
were t\VO on board. Of these Yery's liglits she had on boarcl 
no less than 600 green, -180 red, and 140 white lights, obviously 
a most abnonnal number. It is said by C01nmander Xewman 
that a British vessel of the same class would have about 12 of 
each. At the trial it was discoYered for the first tin1e that a 
record of the number of these lights which had been used, had 
been kept, but that it v/as destroyed by the pay1naster by the 
order of Captain Pfeiffer after the capture, and on the evening 
of the day when they had been informed that the vessel was to 
be put in the Prize Court. * * * 
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"On these facts the learned President found that the Ophelia 
was not adapted or equipped solely as a hospital ship, and with 
that finding their Lordships agree. This finding would in itself 
justify the condemnation, but the n1atter ought not to be left to 
rest tllere, and the use actually made of the Yessel n1ust now 
he considered." (Ibid.) 
The testilnony as to the use of the Ophelia for hos-
pital 'vork is conflicting, and her moven1ents were re-
garded as suspicious, and apparently so1ne ship's papers 
'vere destroyed. The appeal supported the opinion of 
the lower court that-
"the Ophelia was not constructed, adapted or 'nsed for the 
Bpecial and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to the 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecl{ed, and that she was adapted and 
used as a signalling ship for military purposes." (Ibid.) 
0 ont/roversy on use of hospital ships. 1917.-0n J anu-
ary 28, 1917, the Gern1an foreign office requested the 
American En1bassy at Berlin to trans1nit to the British 
Govern1nent a memorandum respecting the misuse of 
hospital ships. In this n1en1orandun1 the first para-
graph states : 
"For some time the enemy Governments, especially the British 
Governn1ent, haYe used their hospital ships not only for the pur-
pose of rendering assistance to the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked, but also for military purposes, and have thereby vio-
lated t.he Hague Convention regarding the application of the 
Geneva Convention to maritime w·arfare." (Parliamentary 
Papers, 1\Iiscellaneous, No. 16 [1917] Cd. 8692, p. 3.) 
There follow specifications of accusations ·which the 
German Government claim have most seriously violated 
the Hague convention regarding the application of the 
Geneva convention to maritime warfare, and then the 
men1orandum concludes: 
"In view of the breach of treaty conunitted by their ~nemies 
the German Government would be enptled to free themselves 
altogether from the obligations contained in the Convention; 
for reasons of humanity, however, they desire still to refrain 
from doing so. On the other hand, they can no longer permit 
the British Government to despatch their troop and munition 
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transports to the principal theatre of war under the hypocritical 
cloak of the Red Cross. They therefore declare that from this 
moment on they will no longer suffer any enemy hospital ship 
in the maritime zone which is situated bet\veen the lines Flam~ 
borough Head to Terschelling on the one hand and Ushant to 
Lands End on the other. Should enemy hospital ships be en-
countered in this maritime zone, after an appropriate lapse of 
time, they will be considered as belligerent and will be attacked 
without further consideration. The German Government be-
lleve themselves all the more justified in adopting these measures 
as the route from Western and Southern France to the 'Vest 
of England still remains open for enemy hospital ships, and 
the transport of English 'vounded to their homes can conse-
quently be effected now as hei·etofore "·ithout hinderance." 
(Ibid., p. 4.) 
To the charges made by. the German Government, the 
British Government replied that the German vessels o£ 
'var had neglected the remedy which 'vas legally avail-
able to them in ease of suspicion. This was to visit and 
inspect the hospital ship in order to determine whether 
the suspicion 'vas 'vell founded. After a general denial 
of the German charges, each is specifically discussed and 
reasons given for the state1nent that British hospital 
ships had conforn1ed to the requirements of the Hague 
convention. 
International Red Cross, 1917.-The German actjon 
in regard to hospital ships led the International Red 
Cross Comn1ittee to address a protest to the Ger1nan 
Government which was later given to the press. 
"GeneYe, 14 avril 1917. 
"Le 29 janvier 1917, le gouvernen1ent allen1and a rendu une 
ordonnance par laquelle, a partir de ce jour, tons les naYires-
hopitaux portant les marques de la Croix-Rouge seraient con-
siden~s comme vaisseaux de guerre, attaques et coules comme 
tels, dans une zone determinee de la l\lanche et de la mer du 
Nord. 
"Le gouvernement all(jinand donne connne motif de cette 
mesure rigoureuse le fait que le gouYernement anglais se ser-
virait habituellement de ses naYires-hopitaux pour le transport 
de troupes et de n1unitions, protegees ainsi par le drapeau de la 
Croix-Rouge. Le gouvernen1ent allemand puise dans cette 
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accusation le droit de se delier vis-a-vi~ d~s na\'h·es-hovitanx 
du respect que les cmiYentions de Geneve et de la Haye im11osent 
a leur egard. 
''Le 20 uuu·s 1D17, un sons-marin allenlaiH1 torpillait !'As-
turias, un vaisseau dont I'a11parence ne Iaissait aucun doute 
sur sa destination, et qui Ia veille avait depose un grand 
nombre fle blesses et <le· mnlndes. PreC'edPmment cleja, un autre 
gt·and vaisseau-hopital, Ie Britannic, avait eu Ie 1neme sort. 
''Le Cmnite international, qui a le droit et le devoir de faire 
respecter les principes de la Croix-Rouge et de la convention de 
Geneve, en signalant les atteintes que pourraient y etre portees, 
attire la tres serieuse attention du gouvernement imperial sur 
la responsabilite qu'il asstunerait vis-a-vis du 1nonde civilise en 
persistant dans une resolution en contradiction avec les con-
Yentions humanitaires qu-il s'est SOlennellement engage a re-
specter. 
"En torpillant des navires-hopitaux, on s'attaque non a des 
combattants, mais h des etres sans defense a des blesses mutiles 
ou brises par Ia lllitraille, a des fenunes que se L1evouent a une 
oeuvre de secours et de charite, a des hommes qui ont pour annes 
non celles qui sen·ent a oter la vie a l'adversaire, mais celles 
au contraire qui peu\ent la lui conserver et apporter quelque 
soulagement a ses souffrances. 
"Tout naYire-hOpital muni des signes exterieurs prevus par les 
conventions internationales et dont 1nise t'n sen·ice a ete 
regulierement notifiee aux belligerants, est au benefice d'une 
presomption !{~gale et doit etre respecte par les belligerants. 
"Ceux-ci, s'ils ont de justes motifs de craindre qu'un navire-
hOpital soit partielle1nent affecte a des buts n1ilitaires, ont sur 
lui, en vertu de !'article 4 de la convention de la Haye, le droit 
de contrOie et de visite: ils peuYent lui imposer une direction 
detenninee et mettre a bord un Cmnmissaire, 1neme le detenir, 
si la gravite des circonstances l'exige. Ils n'ont en aucun cas 
le droit de le couler et d'exposer a la mort tout Ie personnel 
hospitalier et les blesses transportes par ce uavire. 
"I./Asturias parait avoir ete torpilM sans qu'on se soit pre-
occupe ni de son caractere, ni de sa destination. 
":\Ieme si l'on ad1nettait !'exactitude des faits sur lesquels 
I' Allemagne s'appuie pour justifier son ordonnance, le Comite 
international estime que rien ne saurait excuser le 1orpillag~ 
d'un navire-hOpital. 
"C'est pourquoi, considerant !'ordonnance du 29 janvier comme 
f:tant en desaccon1 avec les conventions internationa1es, il ex-
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prhne le voeu que cette ordonnance ne soit plus appliquee a 
l'avenir. 
"Au. n01n dn COJnite international de la Croix-Rouge: 
"Les vicc-Pn3sidents, 




(Revue de Droit International Public, vol. 24 (1917), no. 6, 
p. 471.) 
(e) Hospital ships.-Hospital ships are not to be used 
"for any military purpose." .. A.s long as the hospital 
ships confor1n to the provisions of the Geneva conven-
tion they are not to be captured and are granted in 
neutral ports exe1nption fron1 the usual restrictions a p-
plying to vessels of war. These exe1nptions are granted 
on the ground of the humanitarian occupation to which 
the hospital ship is devoted and the exen1ption ceases 
\vhen other use is 1nade of the vess'el. At such time each 
state n1ust, considering the circtunstances, deter1nine its 
attitude tow·ard and treahnent of the ship. The neutral 
state must fulfil its obligations and the belligerent state 
n1ay exercise its rights. 
As the hospital ship is supposed to be an unarmed 
vessel with a nonbelligerent personnel and incapacitated 
or ship,vrecked persons on board and as by the Geneva 
convention belligerents have the right to "control and 
visit" hospital ships or even to detain them, there would 
seen1 to be no ground for firing upon such a ship unless 
to bring it to if it \\"as atte1npting to escape. 
SOLUTION 
(a) 1. The private neutral seaplane alighting "rithin 
the blockade lines should be seized. The proof of inno-
cence rests upon the seaplane. 
2. The private neutral seaplane alighting 50 1niles 
outside the blockade lines is not liable to seizure unless 
on grounds discovered by visit and search. 
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(b) The military aircraft and cre'v should be in-
terned by state B. 
(c) The ar1ned private aircraft of state X should not 
be supplied ""ith fu~l in a port of R. 
(d) The use of tear gas by one belligerent against 
another is not prohibited, therefore the resort to the 
use of bacteriological bombs in retaliation is unla,vful. 
(e). 1. Neutral state C, while not under obligation 
to pass upon the character of an act of a hospital ship 
of a belligerent, 1nay treat such a ship as a vessel of 
w·ar if convinced that the ship has forfeited its im-
nlunities. 
2. The capture of the Safety by the fleet of Y is law-
ful, but care should be taken to restrict the use of force 
to the minilnun1. 
